Silsilat Al-Anwar comes to us in this issue titled "The Intersection of Sciences and Fields of Knowledge."

The Greek question concerning the idea of "universal science" relates to inquiring about a "universal methodology," which prominent figures in science previously adopted as a comprehensive vision for seeking truth—either in the form of the mathematical path in ancient and modern eras [Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza]... or the empirical path, as agreed upon by seasoned practitioners possessing mastery over everything in the world, down to its finest details. However, the need for a comprehensive and universal methodology has become a matter of old custom and ancient tradition, due to the fading of the concept of the "universal" and the arrival of the "particular," with specialization taking its place. The point is that searching for a universal methodology is no longer useful; rather, the phenomenon of specialized methodologies has recurred alongside the succession of scientific disciplines. As science shifted from unity to multiplicity, methodologies likewise moved to express their importance through multiplicity. Serving as regulatory pillars for science, these methodologies offer their services to the point that Henry Adams found himself acknowledging that "chaos is the law of nature; order is the dream of man." Things present themselves by nature in a state of chaos and disorder, whereas human thought needs to formulate them into laws and present them in a systematic manner so that they "rise" to the realm of scientific knowledge—the realm of science, in short. For this reason, science is often reduced to being the methodology itself, given the utmost importance placed on how its content is presented. The essence of science has shifted from "mere knowledge of the essences of things" to the "investigation of the methodological organization of phenomena," which signifies a tilt of the scale in favor of the "mode of knowledge" rather than its subjects. This is perhaps what Karl Jaspers agrees with when stating that "science is methodological knowledge whose content, in a binding manner, is stable and universally valid." This vastly broad conceptualization is what granted various disciplines the right to claim validity on the grounds that they possess methodologies tailored to them, serving as prerequisite conditions for achieving scientific rigor. Thus, law became a science, politics became a science, the study of psychological phenomena became a science... as did the study of social phenomena, which is also the case for translation, anthropology, and others. This brought about a prevailing kind of nebula—a nebula containing vastly different yet highly precise elements. This calls for a staggering multiplicity of mechanisms and methodologies to the extent that the nebula turned back upon itself, and methodologies assumed greater importance than considering the content of revealing essences as truths specific to phenomena. This represents the contemporary unraveling experienced by sciences, knowledge systems, and the current era in terms of methodological chaos. Gadamer, for his part, expressed this in terms of the mismatch between the methods of natural science mechanically transferred to the phenomena of social and human sciences, advocating instead for "understanding" as a human art that achieves engagement with sciences through the best means of natural science—given that understanding is an openness toward the human horizon and scientific possibility—in addition to Feyerabend's total aversion to what he terms the chaos of methodologies. To what extent can we speak of compatibility between the nebula of sciences and the intensive invocation of methodologies? And what are the paths for the coexistence of sciences and their methodologies?

Prof. Dr. Mourad Gouasmi